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ABSTRACT
Open-access fishery has led to problems of overfishing and dissipation of 
resource rent. Among fishery biologist maximum sustainable yields are 
preferred. To economists, the optimal level of fishing is at maximum economic 
yield where resource rent and consumer surplus are maximized. Nevertheless, 
conventional management schemes by central authority are inefficient among 
tropic coastal state countries with multi-species, multi-gear fisheries, 
Community-based fisheries management (CBFM) is then in an option for a a 
better cost effective management schemes Resource rent can be maximized 
while resources will be more abundant but at the cost of decreasing consumer 
surplus. There is a plausible “underfishing” in adopting CBFM, Supportive 
institutional framework, strong local organization, exclusivity of fishing 
against outsiders, sedentary/inshore fisheries, and recognition on fisherman 
social status are positive factors advocating the adoption of CBFM while the 
negative factors are the opposite, plus heterogeneity of fishermen and 
problems of equity in access to fishing. Economics of CBFM is actually the 
distribution of control power due to market failure. There are external elements 
given to the local fishermen who can only control their internal decisions. The 
optimum is obtained where marginal benefit of CBFM equals marginal cost. 
Factors to be considered are transaction costs, including exclusivity and 
governance costs. In adopting CBFM maximizing resource rent must be 
combined with minimizing transaction costs for an optimum fishing level.
1.  Justification for Community-based Management in Coastal Fisheries
Without an appropriate management scheme, rapid development in the 
fishing industry can lead to problems of overfishing and finally a degradation in 
fishery resources. In open-access fishery, fishermen continue fishing as long as the 
return from fishing can cover the cost. There is no guarantee that if they do not fish 
today, they can catch tomorrow. Profit maximization where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost does not take place in open-acces fishery. Instead, equilibrium will be 
reached where the total revenue equals total revenue ( i.e. average revenue equals 
average cost). Resource rent is dissipated as all those returns from fishing are to be 
paid out in costs of fishing, this does not take into account the cost of the fish
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themselves. The society as a whole loses what they should gain from such resource 
exploitation. At the same time fish abundance is degraded. There will be less fish 
available for future generations.
Among fishery biologists, maximum sustainable yield may be preferred as 
the volume of catch is maximized while fish abundance is maintained at its maximum 
growth rate. Fishery economists favor maximum economic yield where society gets 
the most from those catches. At maximum economic yield where the return per unit 
of catch equals its marginal cost, social benefits including resource rent (accrues to 
the fishing sector) and consumer surplus (accrues to the consumers) are at their 
optimum.
Various attempts have been carried out in order to manage fishery such that 
we can optimize exploitation of fishery resources. Often found conventional fishery 
regulations involve both renewing resource abundance (including closed season, 
closed area, and gear restriction) and control on fishing effort (including limited 
licenses, quotas and taxation). In Southeast Asia, long coastlines and scattered 
landing points make effective fisheries management difficult. There being multi­
species, multi-gear fisheries increases the complexity in fisheries management 
planning. Effective monitoring and enforcement costs are high. Government may not 
be able to afford such costs. Community-based management of coastal fisheries is 
proposed as an alternative for a better management scheme. Limited government 
success in effective fisheries management makes way for community-based 
management in the expectation of improving efficiency, equity, and cost effectiveness 
of fisheries management. Nevertheless there are certain costs involved in 
implementing community-based management in coastal fisheries.
Implementing community-based management in coastal fisheries can be 
considered an approach to rectify the problems of common property as fishery 
resource exploitation can be controlled by the fishing community. Property rights on 
fishery resources is defined at a level. Empowering such management schemes 
increases recognition of resource value and thus a more careful exploitation. 
Nevertheless, granting rights over fishing to the fishing community can lead to 
underfishing equilibrium where the marginal cost of catch equals marginal revenue. 
The fishermen, with rights over fishery resources, want to maximize fishing profit. In 
such cases, fishery resources will not be optimally exploited. Catch will be lower than 
the optimum level while fish stock abundance will be higher. Consumers have to pay 
a higher price at this lower landing volume while resource rent, accrues to the 
fishermen as their fishing profit, is at a maximum. Community-based fishery 
management in fishing villages leads to a greater benefit for local fishermen at the 
cost of present consumers. Nevertheless, the decrease in today’s catch implies that 
fish stocks can be maintained at a higher level. There will be more resources for the 
future.
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2.  Limitation on Community-based Fisheries Management
Inefficiency in central fisheries management among coastal states in 
developing countries has led to the development of community-based fisheries 
management (CBFM). CBFM has been thought of as an effective management 
scheme due to the success in Japanese coastal fisheries management. Nevertheless, 
there are at least two possible weak points of adopting community-based management 
schemes which should be considered a priority. First, there were certain costs 
involved. Second, implementing CBFM can take a long time.
In some cases costs of CBFM can be higher than conventional management 
schemes. Without an appropriate supporting institutional framework, the success of 
CBFM can be questionable. Where the local institutional framework is weak, 
additional investment is needed to strengthen and build up community management 
capacity. Without strong local organization, it can take a long time to develop local 
capability and participation in fishery resource management. The longer the time, the 
worse the resource condition is. There are costs in implementing CBFM. The benefits 
are fishery resource abundance. Cost-effectiveness of CBFM should be evaluated as a 
priority of implementation. Given the right institutional framework, if local 
community can benefit from CBFM, it is likely that they will get involved efficiently 
and effectively.
By characters, high exclusion cost is one of the most important factors 
limiting the chance of success in adopting CBFM. In the case of Japanese coastal 
fisheries, the success can be explained partly by their sedentary species inshore 
fishery in a confined area. Granting fishing rights to fishing communities where local 
fishermen are not able to exclude outsiders from fishing in their fishing ground, can 
be a failure. The management will be more difficult for those highly migratory 
species. Fishing rights over migratory species on the basis of CBFM can be a 
locational advantage but cannot be exclusive to fishery resources.
In fishing communities where fishermen are heterogeneous in their fishing 
skill, cost of internal governance can be high. Fishermen with superior skill earn rent 
from fishing and are inclined to oppose any regulation as their rent will be cut unless 
fishery resources are depleted. Once conservation measures have been agreed, these 
better-off fishermen are the first who can reap benefit from the renewed resource 
abundance, while the marginal fishermen may not be better off. Moreover, if 
introduced in communities with varieties of fishing patterns there can be conflicts of 
interest, thus it is difficult to get an agreement upon management planning.
Equity is another obstruction in implementing CBFM. Granting fishing rights 
to a specific community may not be acceptable, at least politically. Government may 
be reluctant in advocating CBFM in the question of equity and access to fishery 
resources.
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In the case of Japan, fishing rights were granted to coastal fishing 
communities in order to reduce the conflicts among fishermen from different 
communities, while there was strong local traditions and kinship among fishermen in 
the same community. Government support (especially on demarcated fishing rights 
and large scale set-net fishing right schemes) enhanced the success. Recognition of 
fisherman social status is another factor of success for CBFM in Japan. The 
conditions may not be the same in the other countries.
3.  Economics of Community-based Fisheries Management
Market failure due to fish being common property resources and unsuccessful 
conventional fishery management by central authority make way for CBFM. We can 
look at this issue as an attempt to introduce the issue of the distribution of control 
power. Economics is fundamentally, distribution of power through market 
functioning. When control structure works perfectly, the market functions. In case of 
common-property fishery resources, the market fails. Lack of control induces costly 
races in fishing and depletion of resources. High costs of monitoring and enforcement 
constrain effective central management. Control structure has to be corrected. CBFM, 
granting fishing rights thus the control to the community, is recommended as an 
option.
Institutional environments such as laws and regulations, social norms and 
customs are given to the community. These are external elements which are out of the 
community’s control. If institutional environments are CBFM friendly, success is 
more likely. Communities can make decisions on fishery resource utilization and 
conservation such that control will be exerted until marginal cost of control equals 
marginal benefit.
In the aforementioned, adopting CBFM can be costly if there is a high cost of 
exclusion. There are “transaction costs” in adopting CBFM. Transaction costs are 
defined as the costs that arise when a community exercises ownership rights to 
resources and enforces their exclusive right. They consist of the cost of arranging an 
agreement ex ante and monitoring and enforcing ex post. CBFM transaction costs 
depend on measurability of fishery resources. Recognition and awareness of fishery 
resource values lowers the transaction costs of CBFM. Another factor determining 
transaction costs is the nature of transactions. If transactions are voluntary, durable, 
and simultaneous; CBFM transaction costs can be lowered. Lastly, non-exclusivity 
and high governance costs discourages willingness of those local fishermen to 
participate in CBFM schemes. Improving quality of fishery resources will be 
difficult without active participation among fishermen. Transaction costs are high in 
such cases.
Maximizing the net benefit from CBFM involves both maximizing resource 
rent from sustainable stock as well as minimizing transaction costs of the controlled 
fisheries. Whether it is worthwhile to adopt CBFM depends on costs and returns from 
fishing and transaction costs of which exclusivity and governance play a key role. 
CBFM can be a solution if the net benefit from this management scheme can be
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maximized. It is likely that providing an appropriate external environment, where 
prevention on encroachment by the outsiders is possible and governance costs are 
relatively low, it is likely that CBFM is recommendable.
Exclusivity and governance costs depend on several factors including natural 
barriers to entry by outsiders, physical characteristics of fishery resources (being 
sedentary or migratory), fishing patterns (multi-species, multi-gear, seasonal, fishing 
gear conflict, inshore or offshore), state of technology (traditional or modern), 
political support (in favor of uplifting the coastal fisherman livelihood or equity of 
access to fishing), laws and regulations, social organization (strong or weak local 
group: interest, willingness and capacity of the local fishermen in participation on 
CBFM scheme), norms and customs, and relative prices and value judgment on 
fishery resources. These factors should be considered before attempting the adoption 
of CBFM.
Investigation of the economics of CBFM, examining the organization of the 
control structure including various contractual arrangements and economic activities 
and economic results (success and failures and development of coastal fisheries), 
provides basic guidelines in adopting a successful CBFM.
4.  Key Factors for Community-based Fisheries Management
CBFM can work effectively in coastal fisheries where fishery resources, 
being the mainstay of the coastal community, are being depleted. Being the only 
source of income, local fishermen recognize the value of fishery resources and are 
willing to participate in the renewal of, and sustaining their resource abundance. 
Fishing boundaries should be identifiable such that the problem of exclusivity can be 
minimized. Fishermen should be equipped with the capacity of effective management 
at the outset.
Once CBFM is selected, community participation should be strengthened and 
built up to adopt their management plan. Government agencies should provide 
support on community empowerment (including supporting frameworks, laws and 
regulations, finance, and education). Local fishermen are stakeholders and must be 
effectively involved in decision making. Management plans should be decided by the 
local fishermen and worked from bottom-up not top-down. Actions and changes that 
take place must be agreed at community level. Effective involvement of local 
fishermen can be increased if the benefits to be received from CBFM can be visible, 
quick and proportionate to their contributions.
Key factors for successful development of CBFM are as follows.
1. Encouraging participation of local fishermen via participation among relevant 
agencies in preparation for CBFM, consultation, pilot activities, and structured 
learning.
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2. Emphasis on the collaboration at the community level via recognition on the 
need and interest of the locality, assurance of net benefits to the locality from 
their involvement in CBFM, embedding socially strong and active local 
organizations, building up community capacity (including leadership, knowledge 
and skill for effective fishery resource management), support on community’s 
regulations and enforcement.
3. Adoption of appropriate technology that suits the community needs.
4. Effective outreach programs with two different approaches, empowerment and 
extension. The empowerment approach is essential. While the extension 
approach focuses on increasing efficiency in production (fishing as well as 
others), the empowerment approach focuses on effective involvement of the 
locals.
In adopting CBFM, the following checkpoints should be considered.
• Benefits and beneficiaries from CBFM.
• Needs and capacity of the community.
• Needed changes, in the physical sense and capacity, at the community 
level.
• Key persons and community levels and their roles.
• Roles of supportive agencies, both government and non- government.
• Appropriate outreach programs, empowerment and extension.
• Investment in building up the community capacity for effective 
management.
5. Conclusion
Given the right community capacity, CBFM can be an answer, giving an 
effective fisheries management in tropical multi-gear multi-species fisheries. 
Nevertheless there are certain costs involved in the adoption of CBFM. CBFM should 
be selective and may not be applicable on a large-scale basis. Careful design for 
certain success at the initial stage of development can induce more success from this 
management scheme.
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